3 edition of political economy theory of the soft budget constraint found in the catalog.
political economy theory of the soft budget constraint
James A. Robinson
Published
2006
by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, Mass
.
Written in
Edition Notes
| Statement | James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik. |
| Series | NBER working paper series -- no. 12133., Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 12133. |
| Contributions | Torvik, Ragnar., National Bureau of Economic Research. |
| The Physical Object | |
|---|---|
| Pagination | 28 p. ; |
| Number of Pages | 28 |
| ID Numbers | |
| Open Library | OL17629789M |
| OCLC/WorldCa | 66900604 |
The findings from the panel data analysis suggest that the level of public sector debt increases as an outcome of the financial vicious circle created by the soft budget constraint: a knock-on. The concept of ‘soft budget constraint’ was first proposed by Janos Kornai to explain the pervasiveness of shortages under socialism. It has subsequently been understood mostly as a dynamic incentive problem whereby an investor would like to commit not to bail out .
Notes on Microeconomic Theory. This note covers the following topics: The Economic Approach, Consumer Theory Basics, Homothetic and Quasilinear Utility Functions, The Traditional Approach to Consumer Theory, Producer Theory, Choice Under Uncertainty, Competitive Markets and Partial Equilibrium Analysis, Externalities and Public Goods, Monopoly. Robinson and Torvik: w A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint: Gorton: w The Enforceability of Private Money Contracts, Market Efficiency, and Technological Change: Shen and Eggleston: w The Effect of Soft Budget Constraints on Access and Quality in Hospital Care: Goldmanis, Hortaçsu, Syverson, and Emre: w E-commerce and the Market Structure of .
The paper examines the ‘soft budget constraint’ syndrome in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and China, i.e. in the economies pioneering in the introduction of market‐oriented decentralization reforms. Socialist economies exhibit a rather extreme degree of this phenomenon, which to a lesser degree can be observed in mixed economies as well. Soft budget constraint and inflation cycles: a positive model of the macro-dynamics in China Differences in political and economic institutions prevent the models developed for analyzing industrial- analytical framework similar to that used in modern macro-economic theory, our analysis helps highlight the key political and institutional.
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Political motivations for the soft budget constraint have previously been proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (), Boycko et al. (), and Desai and Olofsgård (), who assume political benefits of excess labor in public firms that result in soft budget by: Get this from a library.
A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint. [James A Robinson; Ragnar Torvik; National Bureau of Economic Research.]. Published: Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar, "A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol.
53(7), pagesOctober. citation courtesy of. Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these:Cited by: A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint James A. Robinsona, Ragnar Torvikb, a Harvard University, Department of Government, Littauer, Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MAUSA b Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Department of Economics, Dragvoll, N Trondheim, Norway article info Article history: Received 1 July A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint.
A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint NBER Working Paper No. w Number of pages: 30 Posted: 18 May Last Revised: 28 Aug Downloadable (with restrictions). Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist.
In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop a political economy model where politicians cannot commit to policies that are not ex post optimal.
We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in. A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint Article in European Economic Review 53(7) October with 37 Reads How we measure 'reads'.
for soft budget constraints to persist is that soft budget constraints serve the interests of politicians - this is precisely the reason they are not dismantled. In this paper we develop a fully political economy model of the soft budget constraint. Our starting point, following Alesina (), Osborne and Slivin.
CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist. In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness.
We develop a political economy model where politicians cannot commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. The author focuses on reform, perhaps the most important issue facing countries such as the USSR, Poland, Hungary, and China. Bureaucracy, soft budget constraints, markets, and the nature of the socialist state are the central issues that arise in the course of reforming a socialist s: 1.
Get this from a library. A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint. [James A Robinson; Ragnar Torvik; National Bureau of Economic Research.] -- Abstract: Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist.
In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. Journals & Books; Help Download PDF The Political Economy of Communism, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton () Google Scholar. János Kornai.
Economics of Shortage, North-Holland, Amsterdam () Google Scholar. 6 Li, David, D. Insider Control and the Soft Budget Constraint: A Simple Theory, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan, Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist.
In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop a political economy model where politicians cannot commit to policies that are not ex post optimal.
János Kornai 'The Soft Budget Constraint' David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs 'The Consequences of Central Planning in Eastern Europe' On overview and critique of Kornai's account can be found in Myant, Martin; Jan Drahokoupil ().
Transition Economies: Political Economy in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. Bureaucracy, soft budget constraints, markets, and the nature of the socialist state are the central issues that arise in the course of reforming a socialist first half of the book deals with "classical socialism" and provides a theoretical summary of.
Robinson, James A, and Ragnar Torvik. “A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint.” European Economic Review –Cited by: son of the soft budget constraint phenome-non and other important issues of dynamic commitment in economic theory.
We also discuss problems that remain to be clarified and research tasks ahead in the SBC research program. The causes and consequences of the SBC phenomenon and policies for. Abstract. The concept of ‘soft budget constraint’ was coined by János Komai in his famous book Economics of Shortage ().
In that book, Komai developed a comprehensive theory of the socialist economy (completed in by The Socialist System).The starting point was that in the socialist economy firms had soft budget constraints as opposed to the hard budget constraints firms face.
Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Pap Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint James A. Robinson and Ragnar Torviky August 6, Abstract Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best ex-plained by the political desirability of softness.
We develop a political.Robinson J.A. and Torvik R., () “A Political economy theory of the soft budget constraints,” NBER Working Paper, vol.National Bureau of Economic Research.
Saeidi, A. () “The Accountability of Para-governmental Organizations (Bonyads): The Case of Iranian Foundations,” Iranian Studies, vol. 37, n° 3, pp. –“The place of the Soft Budget Constraint Syndrome in economic theory.” Journal of Comparative Economics, March,26/1: “Tax awareness and reform of the welfare state: Hungarian survey results,” co-authors: László Csontos and Tóth István György.
Economics of Transition,6/2: Also in Hungarian, and Bulgarian.
